Selling off the "family silver" : the politics of privatization in the OECD 1990-2000 by Obinger, Herbert & Zohlnhöfer, Reimut

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Herbert Obinger 
Reimut Zohlnhöfer 
 
 
 
Selling off the “Family Silver”:  
The Politics of Privatization in the OECD 1990-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TranState Working Papers 
 
No. 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sfb597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ − „Transformations of the State“ 
Bremen, 2005 
[ISSN 1861-1176] 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
 
 
Herbert Obinger and Reimut Zohlnhöfer 
Selling off the “Family Silver”: The Politics of Privatization in the OECD 1990-2000 
(TranState Working Papers, 15) 
Bremen: Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, 2005 
ISSN 1861-1176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universität Bremen 
Sonderforschungsbereich 597 / Collaborative Research Center 597 
Staatlichkeit im Wandel / Transformations of the State 
Postfach 33 04 40 
D - 28334 Bremen 
Tel.:+ 49 421 218-8720 
Fax:+ 49 421 218-8721 
Homepage: http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
 
Selling off the “Family Silver”: The Politics of Privatization in 
the OECD 1990-2000 
ABSTRACT 
The 1990s have witnessed unprecedented attempts at privatizing state owned enterprises 
in virtually all OECD democracies. This contribution analyzes the differences in the 
privatization proceeds raised by EU- and OECD-countries between 1990 and 2000. It 
turns out that privatizations are part of a process of economic liberalization in previ-
ously highly regulated economies as well as a reaction to the fiscal policy challenges 
imposed by European integration and the globalization of financial markets. In addition, 
institutional pluralism and union militancy yield significant and negative effects on pri-
vatization proceeds. Partisan differences only emerge if economic problems are moder-
ate, while intense economic, particularly fiscal problems foreclose differing partisan 
strategies. 
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Selling off the “Family Silver”: The Politics of Privatization in 
the OECD 1990-2000 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have witnessed unprecedented efforts at privatization around the 
world reaching their peak in the second half of the 1990s (figure 1). Between 1990 and 
2000, total privatization proceeds in more than one hundred countries amounted to $937 
billion (OECD 2003: 7) of which about 70 percent accrued in the 30 OECD member 
states. In turn, 62 percent of OECD members’ proceeds were generated by the 15 mem-
ber states of the European Union. Table 1 displays two indicators of national privatiza-
tion proceeds between 1990 and 2000. To guarantee comparability, the absolute privati-
zation proceeds (in million US $) presented in column 1 are expressed in relation to 
population size (column 2) and as a percentage of GDP (column 3). Both indicators are 
strongly correlated (r = .94). The last column ranks the countries according to their pri-
vatization proceeds in relation to GDP. It turns out that Portugal, Australia and New 
Zealand have been front-runners of privatization in the 1990s, while the laggards are 
Japan, Germany and the United States. Thus, notwithstanding the temporal coincidence 
of privatizations around the globe depicted in figure 1, significant differences exist be-
tween countries with regard to the revenues raised from privatization between 1990 and 
2000. In this contribution, we apply the classical theoretical approaches of comparative 
public policy research and employ macro-quantitative methods of data analysis to ex-
plain these differences and to identify the underlying economic and political-
institutional determinants. 
Figure 1: Privatization Proceeds 1990-2000 (Mio. US-Dollar). 
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Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, No. 79 June 2001  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
- 2 - 
In a first step we analyze the determinants of privatization proceeds in those countries 
that were members of the EU at the end of our period of observation. However, Luxem-
bourg had to be excluded due to data restrictions. Given the very small number of cases 
(n = 14), we employ a panel design in addition to a cross sectional regression analysis. 
In a second step we extend our sample to the long term members of the OECD in order 
to test the robustness of our results. The East European transition economies, the OECD 
periphery (Mexico, Korea and Turkey) as well as Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland 
were excluded from the sample. We omitted the states of the first group because privati-
zations there were part and parcel of the transformation of centrally planned economies 
to market economies which took place during the period of observation. The countries 
of the OECD periphery were not included due to considerable defects with regard to 
democracy and the rule of law which would have made a most similar cases design im-
plausible. Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland could not be considered because of 
different kinds of data restrictions.  
Privatizations may occur in various forms which, however, do not necessarily imply 
deregulation since privatization may only change the form of government intervention 
concerning service provision, regulation and financing (Feigenbaum et al. 1998: 6). In 
this paper we focus on the sale of state owned enterprises. We thus neither investigate 
the methods of privatization (cf. OECD 2003) nor the utilization of the privatization 
proceeds.  
Table 1: Privatization revenues in 21 OECD Countries 1990-2000 
 
Country 
1 
Privatization Proceeds 
1990-2000 
(million US$) 
2 
Proceeds per capita
1990-2000 
(US$) 
3 
Proceeds in % 
GDP (1990-2000) 
(1/2) 
4 
Rank 
(Proceeds/ 
GDP) 
Australia 69,661 3,764 15.94 2 
Austria 10,439 1,293 5.87 11 
Belgium 9,611 946 4.44 13 
Canada 10,583 366 1.64 18 
Denmark 6,048 1,146 4.64 12 
Finland 11,000 2,137 10.00 4 
France 75,488 1,263 6.14 9 
Germany 21,711 265 1.22 20 
Greece 12,329 1,172 8.50 8 
Ireland 7,613 2,046 9.22 5 
Italy 108,642 1,889 9.03 6 
Japan 37,670 299 1.26 19 
Netherlands 13,641 882 4.19 14 
New Zealand 9,413 2,656 15.89 3 
Norway 2,900 656 2.57 17 
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Country 
1 
Privatization Proceeds 
1990-2000 
(million US$) 
2 
Proceeds per capita
1990-2000 
(US$) 
3 
Proceeds in % 
GDP (1990-2000) 
(1/2) 
4 
Rank 
(Proceeds/ 
GDP) 
Portugal 25,292 2,544 18.24 1 
Spain 37,660 957 5.93 10 
Sweden 17,295 1,956 8.81 7 
Switzerland 6,422 903 3.55 16 
United Kingdom 42,808 735 3.92 15 
USA 6,750 25 0.08 21 
Mean 25,856 1,329 6.72 - 
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends No. 82 (2002); Penn World Table (6.1.), own calculations.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: After a brief review of the existent 
literature (2), the most important theoretical approaches in comparative public policy 
research are surveyed to generate testable hypotheses (3). Section 4 discusses the meas-
urement of the dependent and independent variables and the respective data sources. In 
section 5, the empirical evidence is presented while the last section concludes. 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Most previous research on privatizations in political science has focused on the tempo-
ral sequence and regional spill-overs of privatizations. Earlier studies emphasized the 
pioneering role of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom in the 1980s which was seen as 
inducing a policy diffusion to many other countries (Abromeit 1988; Wright 1994a: 5; 
also Bortolotti/Siniscalco 2004). More recent studies are preoccupied with the direct 
and indirect effects of European Integration. Specifically, the liberalization efforts 
launched by the European Commission in the 1980s and the fiscal policy constraints 
imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht are discussed as catalysts of privatization (S. 
Schmidt 1998; Scharpf 1999; Clifton et al. 2003). In addition, a considerable number of 
edited or single authored volumes exists which focus on the privatization record in par-
ticular countries (cf. Vickers/Wright 1989; Clarke/Pitelis 1993; Wright 1994; Fei-
genbaum et al. 1998; Toninelli 2000; Mayer 2005). 
In contrast, quantitative analyses of the determinants of differences in privatization 
proceeds are rare. An important exception is the pioneering contribution by Carles Boix 
(1997). He resorts mainly to political variables to explain the differences in privatization 
policies in the OECD between 1979 and 1992. According to Boix (1997), parties of the 
right have a significant positive impact on privatization proceeds, while social democ-
ratic governments are more reluctant in their privatization efforts. In addition, the inter-
nal fragmentation of the cabinet and the status as minority government inhibit privatiza-
tions, whereas a weak economic performance prior to the period of observation was 
found to stimulate the sale of state owned enterprises (SOE). 
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Bortolotti et al. (2003)1 and Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004) compare the privatization 
record of 48 countries between 1977 and 1999. These authors also find evidence that 
political institutions and political parties significantly influence privatization policies. 
Specifically, privatization proceeds increase with a governing party of the right (meas-
ured with a dummy variable) and are higher in majoritarian democracies than in polities 
characterized by horizontal and vertical fragmentation of power. Political regime types 
are also important as privatization revenues in autocracies are significantly lower com-
pared with democracies (Bortolotti/Siniscalco 2004: 55). Furthermore, the authors find 
a significantly lower propensity to privatize in German civil law countries.2 Restricting 
the analysis to the OECD countries only, they still find significant effects of political 
institutions, but their ten-scale indicator of the partisan complexion of government fails 
to reach statistical significance. Nevertheless, Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004: 56) sug-
gest that “a more proper test of the partisan dimension of privatization should be carried 
out in the context of wealthy and established democracies.“ This paper attempts to fill 
this void by using a new data set measuring the partisan complexion of governments. At 
the same time, we investigate whether the partisan effects found by Boix (1997) for the 
1980s still exist in the 1990s, a period of marked divesture of public enterprises. Finally, 
in contrast to Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004), we use alternative indicators to measure in-
stitutional pluralism that map the influence of national constitutional rigidities directly, 
i.e. not via the detour of legal origins. 
3. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
To explain the differences in the privatization proceeds of the OECD countries, we rely 
on the well established theoretical approaches of public policy research which have 
been used fruitfully in a number of policy fields (cf. Castles 1998; M. Schmidt 2002). In 
the following we will concentrate on six approaches which, however, should not be seen 
as competing with one another. Instead, they complement each other since every ap-
proach has particular shortcomings which can be remedied by the inclusion of variables 
from other approaches. 
                                                 
1  The sample of Bortolotti et al. (2003) is rather problematic. One the one hand, some OECD countries like Den-
mark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the United States are omitted without any justification, while on the other 
hand a number of developing countries are included. 
2  The theoretical relevance of the variable “legal origins“ is based on the assertion that French and German civil 
law countries maintain a larger SOE sector than common law countries and that French civil law countries tend to 
have erected constitutional barriers against privatizations. Moreover, the legal protection for shareholders and 
creditors is less developed in the latter (Bortolotti/Siniscalco 2004: 49-50). 
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3.1 Privatization as reaction to economic challenges? 
It can be argued that privatization represents a reaction of governments to pressing eco-
nomic challenges. Confronted with high unemployment, dismal economic growth and 
excessive public debt, governments might resort to the recommendations of supply-side 
economists who have dominated the economic policy discourse since the 1980s (Hall 
1993; Boix 1997). According to this view, it is imperative to roll back the state’s influ-
ence on the economy as far as possible to create incentives for economic activity which 
in turn will result in stronger growth and increasing employment. Privatization of SOE 
plays a key role in this conception since many economists have shown privately owned 
firms to be more efficient than SOE (cf. Megginson/Netter 2001; Schneider 2003). This 
is because SOE lack clearly defined goals due to government intervention and are thus 
confronted with sharp trade-offs between profit maximization and more general objec-
tives of government policy such as employment or industrial policy which may result in 
efficiency losses. In addition, the absence of a ‘hard’ budget constraint and the capture 
of SOE by utility maximizing politicians and bureaucrats who exploit public enterprises 
to secure influence and power can lead to inferior efficiency of SOE. Insofar as privati-
zation is associated with increasing market competition, further efficiency gains of pri-
vatization can be expected. 
Therefore, many economists suggest that privatizations stimulate economic growth 
and, in consequence, employment. Governments will most likely be more inclined to 
follow this advice if they are confronted with unsatisfactory economic performance 
(Zohlnhöfer 2003). Hence, we expect a negative effect of economic growth on privati-
zation proceeds – low growth will increase a government’s willingness to launch 
growth stimulating measures, including privatization. By the same token, a positive cor-
relation between unemployment and privatization revenues can be imagined. 
The underlying source of these economic problems may well be the general density 
of state regulation of the economy, which even gains in importance as markets integrate 
further and governments’ competition for investment intensifies. In heavily regulated 
economies, suffering from low growth, an economic policy approach of deregulation 
and privatization could help to break up incrusted structures and initiate impulses for 
growth and employment. We thus expect a positive effect of the initial level of political 
regulation of the economy on privatization revenues. 
Public finance, particularly public debt, may also have direct effects on privatization 
policies. A government confronted with a high level of public debt or – more impor-
tantly – a high budget deficit will search for options to tackle this problem. Most meas-
ures which aim at budget consolidation, namely expenditure cuts and tax increases, are 
unpopular among the voters, however. Therefore, reducing the deficit is politically dif-
ficult. Privatization of SOE could help governments to solve this dilemma at least in the 
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short run by generating revenues, reducing subsidies for SOE and eliminating the need 
to cover their deficits (cf. Wright 1994a: 20; Boix 1997: 477). Thus, privatizations can 
improve the budgetary situation without burdening tax payers or curbing spending. In 
sum, privatizations should be positively related to budget deficits. 
3.2 Privatizations and the effects of governing parties 
The willingness with which governments will adopt basic ideas of supply side econom-
ics varies according to their partisan complexion. As a matter of fact, some of these 
ideas have been implemented by the conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher in 
Britain and of Ronald Reagan in the United States, but also – even though to a lesser 
extent – by the bourgeois coalitions which came to power in Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands in the early 1980s. Theoretically, the readiness of center right parties to 
sell off state owned enterprises is highly plausible, since partisan theory essentially ar-
gues that these parties favor market solutions in economic policy anyway (M. Schmidt 
2002; Zohlnhöfer 2003). 
Moreover, parties of the right may have an electoral incentive to implement privati-
zations: Insofar as they succeed in allocating substantial parts of the shares of privatized 
enterprises among a large part of the electorate, thus establishing some kind of ’popular 
capitalism‘, the economic interests of many voters may change in favor of more market 
friendly policies which might promise to maximize the value of their shares (Bortolotti 
et al. 2003: 308). This change of economic policy interests would in turn benefit bour-
geois parties which will most likely be seen as the parties delivering these kinds of poli-
cies. To secure the broad allocation of shares among the electorate, center right parties 
have a strong incentive to issue shares below market value. This is exactly what could 
be observed in Britain in the 1980s (Abromeit 1988; Richardson 1994: 69). 
Social democratic parties, in contrast, for a long time lacked confidence in the stabil-
ity of the private sector. As a consequence, nationalizations of key industries figured 
prominently in these parties’ economic strategies. SOE were used as ’employment buff-
ers‘ during recessions as well as important instruments of macroeconomic governance. 
The importance social democratic parties attached to SOE until the 1980s (and occa-
sionally even longer) can be seen from the nationalization policies of the French social-
ist government after 1981 as well as from the difficulties the leadership of the British 
Labour Party encountered when amending the party program’s notorious “Clause IV” 
(cf. Merkel 1993). Besides, social democratic parties also faced electoral incentives to 
oppose privatization because employees in SOE belong to their core clientele and were 
most likely to lose some of their privileges in the case of privatization. Thus, we expect 
bourgeois parties to be positively associated with privatization proceeds, whereas social 
democratic government participation should result in lower privatization revenues. 
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3.3. Institutions and Privatizations 
The decision to privatize is mostly the result of legislative processes. Therefore, it is 
likely that political institutions are of major importance for the politics of privatization. 
According to veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002) it can be argued that a change of the 
status quo will become more difficult if the number of veto players increases. The rea-
son is that the transaction costs increase with the number of veto players involved in 
policy-making and, in addition, it becomes more likely that at least one of the actors 
vetoes the privatization decision, either because of programmatic dissent or because 
important political allies, interest groups or decisive parts of the electorate oppose a 
privatization. Empirically, one could think of powerful second chambers, strong presi-
dents or direct democracy as veto players. For example, French president François Mit-
terrand vetoed a privatization decision of the bourgeois government under Jacques 
Chirac in 1986, compelling the government to modify the reform (Dumez/Jeunemaitre 
1994: 93). In Switzerland, many efforts aiming at privatization and deregulation have 
been disapproved by the people at the cantonal level recently and Swiss voters also ve-
toed the liberalization of the electricity market at the federal level in September 2002 
(Wagschal et al. 2002: 92). 
The procedures for changing the constitution may affect the politics of privatization, 
too, because SOE were protected by the constitution in some countries. For instance, the 
Portuguese constitution prohibited the sale of SOE until 1989 (Corkill 1994: 219-20), 
while the French constitution banned privatization of public utilities (Feigenbaum et al. 
1998: 108-9). Until the early 1990s, the German Basic Law stipulated that the railways 
as well as postal services and telecommunications be operated as public administrations 
(Zohlnhöfer 2001: 314). Thus, it can be hypothesized that privatization proceeds will be 
inversely related to the number and power of veto players like second chambers, presi-
dents and referenda. In addition, the more difficult it is to amend the constitution, the 
lower privatization proceeds will be. The fragmentation of governments might also be 
hypothesized to have an effect. The direction of impact is not entirely clear, however. 
According to the logic of veto player theory discussed above, the following correlation 
should hold: the larger the number of parties in a government coalition the more diffi-
cult privatizations become (cf. also Boix 1997: 481f.). Nevertheless, there are also ar-
guments making the opposite hypothesis plausible: If coalition governments aspire to 
reduce budget deficits – which many of them have to, given the Maastricht criteria in 
the EU – they could resort to a ‘lowest common denominator solution’, i.e. they might 
agree on the most uncontroversial consolidation path available. Given the political prob-
lems associated with expenditure cuts or tax increases, privatization might in fact be that 
path. 
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The distribution of competencies between different levels of government may also be 
relevant for the politics of privatization. SOE are not necessarily owned by the central 
government in federal states. It has been widely noted, for example, that in Germany 
most of the potential for privatization was at the level of the states (Länder) and the lo-
cal authorities (König 1988: 535-42). This might lead to low privatization proceeds of 
central governments keen on privatizing if SOE are held by local or regional authorities 
reluctant to sell their holdings. However, this effect might just as likely run the other 
way round: A central government hostile to privatization could also be incapable to pre-
vent regional or local authorities from selling their SOE. Therefore, this effect of feder-
alism is theoretically indeterminate. A consistently negative effect of federalism on pri-
vatizations can only be expected if a central government intends to sell off an enterprise 
of high regional significance but is facing regional authorities who are opposed to the 
privatization and have formal or informal ways of influencing the decision-making pro-
cess at the federal level. Examples abound in the politics of privatization in Germany in 
the 1980s. The prime minister of the state of Bavaria, Strauß, initially resisted the partial 
privatization of the national air carrier Lufthansa because he feared that the strong links 
between the airline and the German aircraft industry, which was mainly situated in his 
state of Bavaria, would loosen after privatization. For similar reasons the prime minister 
of Lower Saxony opposed the Federal government’s sale of shares of Volkswagen 
(Zohlnhöfer 2001: 169f.). Therefore, a weak negative effect of federalism on privatiza-
tion proceeds can be expected. 
3.4 Privatizations and the role of interest groups 
The interests of the associations of capital and labor concerning privatization policies 
diverge sharply. Most enterprises will probably support the privatization of public utili-
ties like telecommunication, energy and transportation because they can hope for lower 
charges resulting from efficiency gains. In addition, they might act as buyers of shares 
of privatized formerly SOE. Nevertheless, due to diverging interests on the part of these 
associations they are unlikely to show strong dedication in favor of privatization poli-
cies. 
In contrast, labor unions, particularly those of affected employees, are likely to op-
pose privatizations. This is because employees of SOE enjoyed particularly safe and 
well paid jobs along with exemplary working conditions (cf. Schwartz 2001). More-
over, union density is much higher in the public sector compared with the private sector. 
Privatization seriously challenges the privileges of the SOE’s employees as can be seen 
from the experiences of the telecommunications sector which was liberalized and pri-
vatized throughout Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. In the former SOE, an enormous 
number of jobs was shed, which the newly established competitors failed to compensate 
for. What is more, the new jobs were less secure and worse paid than the ones lost 
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(Héritier/Schmidt 2000). Unions therefore had every reason to mobilize against the pri-
vatization of SOE and it is likely that privatization revenues decrease as union strength 
or militancy increase. 
3.5 External challenges as movers of privatization 
Privatization might also be influenced by developments beyond the national borders, 
most notably European integration and the internationalization of markets, particularly 
financial markets. It is often argued, that the economic policies of nation states are in-
creasingly monitored, and eventually punished, by international financial markets under 
the conditions of high capital mobility. As a consequence, credibility becomes a major 
goal of governments (Freitag 2001). Thus, governments may feel obliged to switch to 
orthodox economic policies which in turn might include the selling of SOE. Moreover, 
privatizations improve a government’s budgetary position which is of central impor-
tance for the actions of international capital markets (Mosley 2000). Hence, privatiza-
tion proceeds should be positively related to the level of a country’s economic integra-
tion. 
European Integration can also yield an impact on privatization policies as can be seen 
from the example of Southern European countries in particular (Lavdas 1996). At least 
two ways of influence can be distinguished: first via the single market program which 
led to the liberalization of many sectors (S. Schmidt 1998; Clifton et al. 2003). Many of 
the respective services were provided by SOE prior to liberalization. Once liberalization 
had taken place, the legitimacy of state ownership vanished. Thus, privatization became 
the natural option, if it was not required for the success of the liberalization in the first 
place. Increasing competition on these markets provided another rationale for privatiza-
tion: If the enterprises which had controlled or monopolized the national market prior to 
liberalization were to succeed under conditions of more intense competition on the 
home market or as a “global player” in world markets, they had to be freed from the 
restrictions which public enterprises more often than not are subject to for political or 
administrative reasons (Wright 1994a: 4; Schmidt 1996). 
Secondly, the Maastricht deficit criteria played an important role. European govern-
ments aspiring to join monetary union had to present a public deficit of less than 3 per-
cent of GDP and public debt below 60 percent of GDP in 1997. Since the latter criterion 
allowed for some exceptions, European governments above all focused on the deficit in 
the 1990s. Therefore, the deficit criterion (and its follow-up in the stability and growth 
pact) put at least those governments under intense fiscal strain that ran the risk of fail-
ing. These governments in turn seem likely to resort to privatizations. For these reasons, 
a positive association between EU membership and privatization proceeds is expected. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
- 10 - 
3.6 The Legacies of the Past 
Finally, one variable has to be discussed which is certainly a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition for the explanation of privatization policies: the level of state ownership 
at the beginning of our period of observation. A multiplicity of reasons exists for the 
differences in the size of the SOE sector and thus the potential for privatization at the 
disposal of the governments in the 1990s. Some nationalizations were pursued for mili-
tary reasons, others were ideologically motivated, whereas still others were based on 
economic or industrial policy considerations. Finally, national industries emerged in the 
context of historical junctures such as the Great Depression, the Second World War or 
the transformation from authoritarianism to democracy (cf. Toninelli 2000: 10-21). In 
Austria, for example, the nationalizations of the late 1940s attempted to safeguard Aus-
trian industry from Soviet reparation claims. In contrast, Portugal only saw a wave of 
nationalizations in the wake of the revolution of 1974 (Corkill 1994: 215; Clifton et al. 
2003: 21, 70).  
Irrespective of the diverging reasons for their emergence, the differences in the pre-
existing stock of state ownership are likely to define the policy leeway a government 
enjoys with respect to privatization policies. Obviously, a government can only privat-
ize as many SOE as it owns in the first place. Therefore, privatization proceeds will be 
particularly low in countries where the government traditionally owned only few enter-
prises (e.g. USA, Germany) or sold most of them before 1990 (e.g. United Kingdom).  
4. MEASUREMENT, DATA AND METHOD 
The dependent variable of this study is the sum of the privatization proceeds raised in 
each of 20 OECD member states between 1990 and 2000. The data are taken from the 
OECD’s Financial Market Trends No. 82 (2002). Unfortunately, the statistical series 
does not go back further than 1990. Therefore, earlier privatizations cannot be ac-
counted for. In some cases this results in a significant underestimation of privatization 
proceeds. A case in point is Britain where the Thatcher government implemented a large 
scale privatization program already in the 1980s (Abromeit 1988). Similarly, Japan star-
ted privatization early on, yielding almost $80 bn. from the sale of the state owned tele-
communications enterprise NTT in 1987/8 (Megginson/Netter 2001). Nevertheless, for 
the better part of the OECD, privatization only started to play a major role in the 1990s. 
Therefore, our data capture the relevant developments quite accurately. Since the reve-
nues from privatization vary according to country size, standardization is necessary, 
however. Thus, the privatization proceeds of each country are divided by that country’s 
average GDP in the period between 1990 and 2000. 
To minimize the bias resulting from the missing data on privatization proceeds in the 
1980s, one needs to control for the stock of state owned enterprises at the beginning of 
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our period of observation. This is not easy to measure, however. The ‘European Centre 
of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Inter-
est’ (CEEP 2000) provides an index which includes the number of salaried employees, 
gross added value and gross capital formation of enterprises with majority public par-
ticipation in the non-agricultural merchantable economy. This indicator seems to be 
well suited to depict the level of state ownership. It is only available for EU member 
states, however, and equivalent data for the other OECD countries are lacking. For the 
analysis of the OECD sample we used the indicator ‘Government Enterprises and Pub-
lic Sector Investment as a share of the economy’ of the ‘Economic Freedom of the 
World Report’ (Gwartney/Lawson 2000) instead. 
The data for the partisan composition of governments is taken from Schmidt et al. 
(2000). These data provide the cabinet participation of ten party families on a daily ba-
sis. We use two different indicators of partisan complexion of government: The cabinet 
share of left parties and that of center right parties. Social democratic, socialist and 
(post-)communist parties were classified as left parties, while liberal, conservative, 
Christian democratic and right parties as well as parties of the center which are not 
Christian democratic were categorized as bourgeois parties. Note that these indicators 
do not consider the cabinet shares of agrarian, regional and green parties as well as un-
affiliated cabinet members. The same source has been used for the indicator of govern-
ment fragmentation, namely the number of coalition partners in a given government. 
For the institutional variables, the indicators developed by Huber et al. (1993), Co-
lomer (1996) and Schmidt (2000) are employed to check for the effects of institutional 
barriers against privatization (source: Schmidt 2000). In addition, the impact of specific 
institutions like federalism, bicameralism and constitutional rigidity is of interest. To 
test their effects, data compiled by Lijphart (1999) are used. Moreover, his indices of 
federalism, bicameralism and constitutional rigidity were standardized and, on that ba-
sis, two additive indices have been calculated. 
The indicators measuring economic problem pressures are taken from the OECD’s 
Economic Outlook Database except the economic growth data which are taken from 
Maddison (2003). Regarding public finance, both public debt and the budget deficit are 
considered. With respect to budget deficits, we constructed an indicator reflecting the 
number of years between 1990 and 1995 in which the country’s deficit exceeded three 
percent of GDP.3 The three percent threshold played an enormous symbolic role in the 
EU member states since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and its convergence crite-
ria, but may also have diffused to countries outside the EU as a benchmark. To measure 
                                                 
3  The restriction to the first half of the 1990s rules out problems of endogeneity since, other things being equal, 
privatizations reduce budget deficits. 
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the impact of economic growth performance, two variables have been calculated: first 
the deviation from the mean of the OECD countries during the period of observation, 
second an indicator which takes into account the diverging catch-up potentials of na-
tions emphasized by neoclassical growth theory. Thus, the residuals from a regression 
of the log of GDP per capita in 1985 on the average economic growth between 1985-95 
were employed to map the relative growth performance (for the theoretical background 
cf. Obinger 2004). 
As a further indicator for economic challenges, we test the general level of state 
regulation of the economy at the beginning of the period of observation, measured by 
the Economic Freedom Index developed by Gwartney/Lawson (2000). This index had 
to be modified, however, since in its original version it included the variable ‘Govern-
ment Enterprises and Public Sector Investment as a share of the economy’ which is al-
ready used as an indicator of the original level of state ownership. 
The strength and militancy of labor unions is measured via union density at the be-
ginning of the 1990s (data from Castles 1998) and the number of working days lost per 
1,000 employees due to industrial conflicts respectively (data from Armingeon et al. 
2004). The hypotheses concerning the international determinants of privatization poli-
cies are tested with an indicator that reflects the number of years between 1990 and 
1995 a country’s deficit has exceeded three percent of GDP and by using an indicator of 
economic openness provided by Armingeon et al. (2004) which depicts different aspects 
of financial openness. In addition, we included a dummy variable to estimate the effects 
of EU membership. 
In the following statistical analysis, the hypotheses generated in section 3 are tested 
with simple cross sectional regressions. We use two samples, first the member states of 
the EU and second the long term members of the OECD. Unless mentioned otherwise 
previously, all independent variables are averages over the period of observation. In 
order to increase the number of observations we also estimated a panel model for the 
EU sample. For that purpose, the period of observation was split into three sub-periods 
(1990-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-2000). This periodization is due to two reasons. On 
the one hand, the CEEP’s (2000) data for the level of state ownership are only available 
for 1991, 1995 and 1998. On the other hand, this periodization allows for identifying 
temporal effects connected to the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
European Stability and Growth Pact. For the OECD sample, data of similar quality for 
the size of the public enterprise sector do not exist which precludes the estimation of 
panel regressions. Nevertheless, given the larger number of cases, a panel design does 
not necessarily seem required.  
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 European Union 
Table 2 summarizes the regression results for the 14 EU member states. Specifications 1 
and 2 report the findings of the cross section analysis. In both models the influences of 
political and economic variables are jointly estimated. As expected, the coefficient of 
the initial level of state ownership shows a negative sign and is significant at the 5%-
level. The same is true for the indicator measuring the effect of bicameralism, federal-
ism and constitutional rigidity. The partisan complexion of government, in contrast, 
does not gain statistical significance. The signs of the coefficients show the theoretically 
expected direction of influence but both coefficients remain statistically insignificant (1 
vs. 2). In contrast, the variables measuring economic challenges and labor militancy 
have a major impact on privatization revenues. While it turns out that a high level of 
industrial conflict significantly decreases privatization proceeds, a high level of regula-
tion of the economy at the start of the period of observation and a frequent violation of 
the 3% deficit criterion yields a catalyzing effect on privatizations. Thus, other things 
being equal, privatization proceeds tend to increase the more often a country’s budget 
deficit exceeds 3 percent of GDP, the more heavily the economy was regulated at the 
beginning of the period of observation,4 the larger the public enterprise sector was at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the less working days are lost due to industrial conflict and the 
larger the institutional leeway for a government is in a country. All other variables dis-
cussed above did not gain statistical significance in the cross section analysis (not re-
ported). This applies for economic openness, economic growth, unemployment, public 
debt at the beginning of the period of observation, union density and government frag-
mentation. 
Table 2: Determinants of Privatization proceeds in 14 EU member states 
 Dependent Variable: Privatization proceeds in % GDP (Period means) 
 Cross-section  
(1990-2000) 
Panel (1990-94,1995-1997, 1998-2000) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 40.11*** 
(8.62) 
43.09*** 
(8.60) 
1.63 
(1.49) 
2.64* 
(1.41) 
1.65 
(1.62) 
2.37 
(1.65) 
Initial size of SOE sector .23** 
(.08) 
.21** 
(.08) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.14** 
(.07) 
.17** 
(.07) 
Cabinet share of bourgeois 
parties 
.04 
(.03) 
 .007 
(.010) 
 0.007 
(.01) 
.009 
(.01) 
Bicameralism, federalism & 
constitutional rigidity 
-2.80** 
(.88) 
-2.85** 
(.93) 
-1.58*** 
(.52) 
-1.66*** 
(.51) 
-1.59*** 
(.52) 
-1.69*** 
(.54) 
                                                 
4  Note that higher values of the index indicate a lower level of regulation of the economy. 
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 Dependent Variable: Privatization proceeds in % GDP (Period means) 
 Cross-section  
(1990-2000) 
Panel (1990-94,1995-1997, 1998-2000) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Budget deficit > 3%  
of GDP 
.65** 
(.25) 
.55* 
(.23) 
.40** 
(.18) 
.38** 
(.17) 
.41** 
(.18) 
.52*** 
(.19) 
Economic freedom 
1990 
-4.48*** 
(.99) 
-4.34*** 
(1.03) 
    
Number of working days 
lost 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
Cabinet share of left parties  -.03 
(.03) 
 -.012 
(.01) 
  
Unemployment rate     .006 
(.09) 
 
Government debt as % GDP      -.015 
(.01) 
Dummy (1995-97)   .10 
(.74) 
.16 
(.73) 
  
Dummy (1998-00)   2.25*** 
(.79) 
2.36*** 
(.77) 
2.20*** 
(.67) 
2.37*** 
(.68) 
R2 .92 .91 .47 .49 .47 .51 
Adj. R2 .85 .84 .36 .37 .35 .39 
N 14 14 39 39 39 38 
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients, OLS-standard errors in parenthesis. * p≤ .10; ** p≤ .05; *** p≤ .01; 
Cross section: cabinet share of parties = Mean 1989-2000; Number of working days lost = Mean 1989-2000. Budget 
deficit = number of years between 1990 and 1995 in which the 3-percent criterion of the Maastricht treaty has been 
violated. 
Panel: On the basis of a Langrange-Multiplier test a classic OLS-regression has been computed. With the exception 
of the level of public debt and the size of the SOE sector, which are measured at the beginning of each period, all 
independent variables are averages over the periods 1990-95, 1995-1997 and 1998-2000. The budget deficit variable 
is lagged by one period (for the first sub-period [1990-1995] the period 1989-1991 was used) to avoid endogeneity 
problems.   
Admittedly, the number of degrees of freedom has been strained in these two models. 
To inflate the number of observations and to check for the robustness of the findings, 
we estimated a panel model (specifications 3-6). Due to multicollinearity we did not 
jointly estimate the Economic Freedom index and the initial size of the public sector5. 
To identify temporal-specific effects, we have used dummy variables for each period. In 
particular, we expect a positive effect for the period 1995-97 because the pressures on 
                                                 
5  The correlation between the size of the public enterprise sector and the level of regulation of the economy is 
r = .65.  
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the member states to consolidate their budgets were particularly high during the run up 
to the reference year of the Maastricht criteria in 1997. 
The regression results are consistent with the findings of the cross sections analysis. 
Again, there are no significant partisan effects, while the coefficients of the other inde-
pendent variables show the theoretically expected signs and remain significant. With 
respect to the economic pressures, we did not find any significant effects for the rate of 
unemployment (5), the level of public debt at the beginning of the period (6), economic 
growth and trade openness (not reported). In contrast, the significant positive effect of 
high budget deficits on privatization revenues remains robust. Surprisingly, only the 
dummy of the final sub-period turns out to be significant. One reason for this could be 
that, in contrast to the two preceding sub-periods, significant partisan differences have 
appeared in the period 1998-2000. This interpretation is supported by the results of 
cross section regressions for each of the three sub-periods. While the effects of the other 
variables discussed remain robust in all three regressions and the partisan complexion of 
the government fails to reach statistical significance in the first two sub-periods, we 
estimated a significant positive impact of bourgeois parties on privatization proceeds for 
the period 1998-2000 (not reported in table 2).6 
5.2 OECD 
We were not able to replicate the empirical findings for the EU members in a cross sec-
tion analysis of 20 OECD countries. Only the negative effects of a heavily regulated 
economy on privatization proceeds remained significant, whereas neither the political 
nor the other economic variables reached statistical significance (not shown in table 3). 
However, this result is exclusively driven by the Australian case and we were able to 
identify the partisan complexion of government as the variable causing the model to 
collapse. In Australia, just as in neighboring New Zealand, the Labour Party adopted 
rather far-reaching market-oriented economic policies since the 1980s. The program-
matic stances of the Antipodean Labour parties regarding economic policy in the 1980s 
cannot be regarded as typical for other social democratic parties, however. “Australia 
and even more New Zealand were the only OECD nations in which Labour/Social De-
mocratic governments sought to actively transform society and economy toward a ‘mo-
re market’ model on a scale comparable with the ambitions of the right” (Castles et al. 
1996: 2). The reasons for the singular path chosen by these Labour Parties lie in the 
remarkable crises both political economies experienced in the early 1980s which were 
                                                 
6  The sign of the coefficient of the dummy for the period 1998-2000 might also suggest that after the inception of 
the European stability pact the efforts at privatizations have been further intensified, possibly to prevent sanctions 
and to increase credibility in the context of EMU. This interpretation does not seem too plausible, though, given 
the amelioration of the budgetary situation throughout the EU in the second half of the 1990s. 
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not resolved by the respective conservative parties that governed both countries for 
most of the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Schwartz 2000: 92; 110). Since Australia and New 
Zealand belonged to the most heavily regulated economies in the OECD, a turn to even 
more state intervention may not have seemed plausible. Therefore, both the economic 
situation and party competition incited the left parties to adopt liberal economic policy 
stances (cf. Castles et al. 1996; Quiggin 1998). The New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP), 
however, was voted out of office in 1990 and suffered the split of its right wing around 
the former Finance Minister, Roger Douglas. When the NZLP resumed power in De-
cember 1999, its economic policy position had come close to the social democratic 
mainstream again, and its singular programmatic position in the 1980s thus does not 
pose a problem for our analysis. The Australian Labour Party (ALP) in contrast, re-
mained in power until March 1996 and its deviant programmatic position thus heavily 
influenced the politics of privatization in Australia.7 Therefore, we excluded Australia 
from our sample.8 
The empirical findings for the thus modified model are summarized in table 3 and 
largely coincide with the results for the EU sample reported in table 2. Nevertheless, for 
the OECD sample we find significant partisan influences on privatization proceeds 
which failed to reach statistical significance in the EU sample: Right parties opted for 
privatization more extensively than left parties did (cf. equations 7 vs. 8). Regarding the 
other variables, the estimations for the OECD sample resemble the ones of the EU sam-
ple. We again find a positive relation between the initial size of the SOE sector and pri-
vatization proceeds. In line with the EU findings, an initially high density of regulation 
of the economy and high levels of industrial conflicts exert highly significant effects on 
revenues from privatization. While strikes tend to inhibit privatizations, a low level of 
economic freedom at the beginning of our period of observation operated as a stimulus 
                                                 
7  The ALP committed itself to privatization comparatively late (Quiggin 1998: 87). Nevertheless, the party acted as 
a pacemaker for Australian privatization policies which had consequences far beyond its own term of office. Par-
ticularly the conservative Howard government’s extensive privatization program benefited from the ALP’s previ-
ous liberal economic policy stance for two reasons. First, the ‘National Competition Policy Act’ adopted by the 
ALP government laid the groundwork for further liberal reforms, particularly in the SOE sector (Quiggin 1998: 
81). Second, given the previous policies of the ALP, the Howard government’s privatization program appeared 
without alternative. Thus, the tempering effects which the competition with a traditional social democratic party 
might have yielded on Howard’s privatization program failed to materialize (cf. Greenfield/Williams 2003: 
295f.). A more detailed study of Australian privatization policies is needed which is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, however. 
8  The results reported below do not change substantially if Australia is included and the ALP is coded as a center 
party (for this kind of procedure cf. Siegel 2002). 
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for privatizations. In addition, we again find that high budget deficits are pertinent to 
privatizations. Regarding political institutions, we find the same negative effect of insti-
tutional pluralism on privatization proceeds we already reported for the EU. All indica-
tors used to measure institutional pluralism, i.e. the index of bicameralism, federalism 
and constitutional rigidity adopted from Lijphart (7-12), Colomer’s (1996) index of in-
stitutional pluralism as well as the indicators developed by Huber et al. (1993) and 
Schmidt (2000) (not presented in table 3) turn out to be significantly and negatively 
related to privatization proceeds. We also tested Lijphart’s indices of federalism, consti-
tutional rigidity and bicameralism separately and again detected a statistically signifi-
cant negative impact (not presented in table 3). 
Table 3: Determinants of Privatization proceeds in 20 OECD member states 
 Dependent Variable: Privatization proceeds in % GDP  
Cross section (1990-2000) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Intercept 45.36*** 
(7.96) 
51.86*** 
(8.41) 
46.90*** 
(7.74) 
44.57*** 
(9.14) 
41.94*** 
(8.14) 
58.15*** 
(9.45) 
Initial size of SOE sector 0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.24** 
(0.08) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
Economic freedom 
1990 
-5.39*** 
(0.97) 
-4.82*** 
(1.05) 
-5.76*** 
(0.97) 
-5.47*** 
(1.08) 
-5.24*** 
(0.95) 
-6.85*** 
(1.12) 
Cabinet share of bourgeois 
parties 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
 0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Bicameralism, Federalism 
and Constitutional Rigidity 
-5.06*** 
(0.90) 
-4.95*** 
(0.98) 
-4.82*** 
(0.89) 
-5.10*** 
(0.96) 
-5.22*** 
(0.88) 
-4.47*** 
(0.85) 
Budget deficit > 3%  
of GDP 
0.72*** 
(0.20) 
0.58** 
(0.22) 
0.72*** 
(0.19) 
0.72*** 
(0.21) 
0.69*** 
(0.20) 
0.64*** 
(0.19) 
Number of working days 
lost 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
Cabinet share of left par-
ties 
 -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
    
Fragmentation of Govern-
ment 
  0.49 
(0.35) 
   
Openness (1989-2000)    0.10 
(0.49) 
  
Government debt as % 
GDP 1989 
    2.16 
(1.63) 
 
Economic growth 1985-
1995 (Deviation from 
OECD-Mean) 
     -1.08* 
(0.53) 
R2 .92 .90 .93 .92 .93 .94 
Adj. R2 .87 .85 .88 .86 .88 .90 
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients, OLS-standard errors in parenthesis. * p≤ .10; ** p≤ .05; *** p≤ .01.  
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Finally, the variables which yielded insignificant results in the EU sample (unemploy-
ment, public debt, union density, economic openness, and the number of governing par-
ties) also turned out to remain insignificant in the OECD sample. Equation 9 reports the 
results for the fragmentation of government. In contrast to Boix (1997), we find a posi-
tive, but insignificant effect of government fragmentation on privatization proceeds. In 
terms of economic openness, in line with our expectations, the estimated coefficient 
suggests that open economies, other things being equal, show greater propensity to sell 
off public enterprises (10). The coefficient is highly insignificant, however. The same is 
true for the EU dummy which is also positively but highly insignificantly related to pri-
vatization proceeds (not presented). These findings might lead to the conclusion that 
globalization and European integration do not catalyze privatizations per se, but that 
both phenomena only exert effects on countries that are confronted with considerable 
economic problem loads. 
The coefficient for public debt also displays the expected sign9, but remains insig-
nificant (11). Finally, unlike in the EU sample, a dismal growth performance, measured 
as the deviation from the average growth rate in the OECD between 1985 and 1995, 
turns out to be significant at the 10%-level in the OECD sample. According to the sign 
of the respective coefficient, countries with below average growth rates have privatized 
more than economically flourishing countries (12). 
6. CONCLUSION 
Which conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence? Apparently, the differ-
ences in privatization proceeds of western democracies can primarily be traced back to 
varying economic problem loads these countries face. But political variables also help 
to explain the national variations in the revenues from the sales of state owned enter-
prises. At least the findings for the broader OECD comparison suggest that the partisan 
complexion of government still plays a role. In this respect, the findings of Boix (1997) 
could be replicated in principle. Remarkable differentiations have to be introduced, 
however. Our analysis did not uncover significant partisan differences in the EU while 
Australia had a substantial leverage on the estimated impact of political parties in the 
broader OECD comparison. Therefore, our findings suggest that the impact of the parti-
san complexion of government on privatization policies has become more fragile in 
recent years. 
Specifically, partisan differences seem to have become conditional; they only occur 
if economic problems are controlled for. That is to say that parties which are confronted 
with intense economic, particularly fiscal problems adopt similar policy responses – at 
least in the case of privatization policies. We have identified three economic challenges 
                                                 
9  Note that we estimated a negative coefficient in the EU panel regressions (cf. table 2).  
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which have prompted privatizations irrespective of the partisan orientation of the gov-
ernment of the day, namely an initially high regulatory density, a frequent violation of 
the (symbolic) deficit threshold of three percent of GDP and – only in the OECD sam-
ple – an inferior growth performance. Privatizations thus can be seen as part of a policy 
of economic liberalization in previously highly regulated economies as well as a reac-
tion to the fiscal policy challenges imposed by European integration and the globaliza-
tion of financial markets. This result underscores the growing importance of suprana-
tional and transnational influences on national policy making and could also provide a 
clue for the explanation of the differences we found between the EU and the OECD 
samples. Apparently, the single market program and particularly the Maastricht criteria 
have set in motion a strong process of convergence within the EU, which has leveled 
partisan differences in this policy field. The interpretation that partisan differences dis-
appear if governments are exposed to substantial economic problem pressure could also 
explain the positive effect of bourgeois parties on privatization proceeds we found for 
the EU in a cross sectional regression for the period 1998-2000. In the second half of 
the 1990s, the budgetary situation has improved in all EU member states and after 1997 
the decision concerning membership in the EMU had finally been taken. As a result, 
there might have emerged some leeway for partisan differences at the end of the decade. 
Boix (1997) holds that parties, unable to pursue distinct macroeconomic policies any-
more because of international financial markets, now turn to diverging supply side poli-
cies. This claim has to be modified. Possibly, in times of austerity even social democ-
ratic parties prefer the political advantage of gaining extra revenues without major po-
litical conflicts via privatization to the opportunity of employing the public sector to 
improve productivity of capital and labor as Boix (1997: 479) would argue.  
This run into privatization induced by economic challenges irrespective of partisan 
control of the government might also explain why we were not able to replicate the im-
peding effect of multi-party coalitions reported by Boix (1997).10 It seems that the ten-
sions resulting from a privatization decision within a coalition have dramatically de-
creased during the last 20 years, possibly also as a result from converging party plat-
forms. According to the logic of blame avoidance coalition partners might indeed find 
as many arguments for as against a given privatization.  
                                                 
10  Note that we used a different indicator of government fragmentation. Boix (1997) employed the Rae index 
whereas we used the number of parties in government. The fact that we were not only unable to replicate the find-
ings with our indicator but that even the sign of the respective coefficient changed seems to put the robustness of 
the effects of government fragmentation on privatization proceeds seriously in question. This is not too much of a 
surprise, however, since the effect is indeterminate at the theoretical level as well (see above). 
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In addition to the increasing importance of transnational and supranational influences 
on national economic policies, domestic institutional settings like federalism and consti-
tutional rigidity remain important. Our empirical evidence is not only in accordance 
with the results reported by Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004), who identified majoritarian 
democracies as a catalyst for privatizations, but also corroborates veto player theory 
claiming a status quo bias of countries with many veto players. Finally, severe industrial 
conflicts reduce privatizations. Apparently, it is not the unions’ organizational strength 
but their conflict behavior that is decisive for the successful implementation of privati-
zation programs as can be seen from the fact that the number of working days lost due 
to strikes and not union density has statistically proven to be of decisive influence. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
- 21 - 
REFERENCES 
Abromeit, H. (1988). British privatization policy, Parliamentary Affairs, 41, 68-85. 
Armingeon, K., Leimgruber, P., Beyeler, M., & Menegale, S. (2004). Comparative political data set 
1960-2002. Bern. < http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/mitarbeiter/ru_armingeon/CPD_Set_en.asp> 
Boix, C. (1997). Privatizing the public business sector in the eighties: economic performance, partisan 
responses and divided governments, British Journal of Political Science, 27, 473-496. 
Bortolotti, B., Fantini, M., & Siniscalco, D. (2003). Privatization around the world: evidence from panel 
data, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 305-322. 
Bortolotti, B. & Siniscalco, D. (2004). The challenges of privatization. An international analysis. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Castles, F. G. (1998). Comparative public policy. Patterns of post-war transformation. Cheltenham: El-
gar. 
Castles, F. G., Gerritsen, R., & Vowles, J. (1996). Introduction: setting the scene for economic and politi-
cal change. In F. G. Castles, R. Gerritsen & J. Vowles (Eds.), The great experiment. Labour parties 
and public policy transformation in Australia and New Zealand. Auckland: Allen & Unwin, 1-21. 
CEEP (2000). The development of enterprises of public participation and of general economic interest in 
Europe since 1996. Their economic impact in the European Union. CEEP Statistical Review 2000. 
Brussels. http://www.ceep.org/statistics/StatEUsumEn.doc 
Clarke, T. & Pitelis, C. (Eds.). (1993). The political economy of privatization. London/New York. 
Clifton, J., Comin, F., & Diaz Fuentes, D. (2003). Privatization in the European Union. Public enter-
prises and integration. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Colomer, J. M. (Ed.). (1996). Political institutions in Western Europe. London: Routledge. 
Corkill, D. (1994). Privatization in Portugal. In V. Wright (Ed.), 215-227. 
Dumez, H. & Jeunemaitre, A. (1994). Privatization in France: 1983-1993. In V. Wright (Ed.), 83-104. 
Feigenbaum, H., Henig, J., & Hamnett, C. (1998). Shrinking the state. The political underpinnings of 
privatization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Freitag, M. (2001). Politische Grundlagen glaubwürdiger Wirtschaftspolitik: Österreich und die Schweiz 
im internationalen Vergleich, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 30, 275-290. 
Greenfield, C. & Williams, P. (2003). Limiting politics: Howardism, media rhetoric and national cultural 
commemorations, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38, 279-297. 
Gwartney, J., & Lawson, R. (2000). Economic freedom of the world: 2000 annual report. Vancouver. 
http://www.freetheworld.com 
Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in 
Britain, Comparative Politics, 25, 275-296. 
Héritier, A., & Schmidt, S. K., 2000: After liberalization. Public interest services and employment in the 
utilities. In F. W. Scharpf & V. A. Schmidt (Eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy. Vol. II: 
Diverse responses to common challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 554-596. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
- 22 - 
Heston, A., Summers, R. & Aten, B. (2002). Penn World Table, Version 6.1, Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania, October 2002. 
Huber, E., Ragin, C., & Stephens, J. D. (1993). Social democracy, Christian democracy, constitutional 
structure, and the welfare state, American Journal of Sociology, 99, 711-749. 
König, K. (1988). Developments in privatization in the Federal Republic of Germany: problems, status, 
outlook, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 54, 517-551. 
Lavdas, K. (1996). The political economy of privatization in southern Europe. In D. Braddon & D. Foster 
(Eds.), Privatization: social science themes and perspectives. Aldershot, 233-260. 
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Maddison, A. (2003). The world economy: historical statistics. Paris: OECD. 
Mayer, F. (2005). Der Niedergang des unternehmerisch tätigen Staates. Die Privatisierungspolitik 
Frankreichs, Großbritanniens, Italiens und Deutschlands im Vergleich. Heidelberg (unpubl. Disserta-
tion). 
Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001). From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on privati-
zation, Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 321-389. 
Merkel, W. (1993). Ende der Sozialdemokratie? Machtressourcen und Regierungspolitik im westeuropäi-
schen Vergleich. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Mosley, L. (2000). Room to move: international financial markets and national welfare states, Interna-
tional Organization, 54, 737-773. 
Obinger, H. (2004). Politik und Wirtschaftswachstum. Ein internationaler Vergleich. Wiesbaden: VS-
Verlag. 
OECD (2003). Privatising state-owned enterprises. An overview of policies and practices in OECD coun-
tries. Paris.  
Quiggin, J. (1998). Social democracy and market reform in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 14, 76-95. 
Richardson, J. J. (1994). The politics and practice of privatization in Britain. In V. Wright (Ed.), 57-82. 
Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch? Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. 
Schmidt, M. G. (2000). Demokratietheorien. Eine Einführung. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
Schmidt, M. G. (2002). The impact of political parties, constitutional structures and veto players on pub-
lic policy. In H. Keman (Ed.), Comparative democratic politics. London: Sage, 166-184. 
Schmidt, M. G., Gohr, A., Hardt, F.; Jochem, S.; Obinger, H., Siegel, N. A., Wagschal, U., & Zohlnhöfer, 
R. (2000): Die parteipolitische Zusammensetzung von Regierungen in 23 OECD Demokratien, 1945-
2000, unpublizierter Datensatz, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Universität Bremen. 
Schmidt, S. K. (1996). Privatizing the federal postal and telecommunications services. In A. Benz &  K. 
H. Goetz (Eds), A new German public sector? Reform, adaptation and stability. Aldershot u.a., 45-70. 
Schmidt, S. K. (1998). Liberalisierung in Europa. Die Rolle der Europäischen Kommission. Frank-
furt/New York. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
- 23 - 
Schneider, F. (2003). Privatization in the OECD countries: theoretical reasons and results obtained. De-
partment of economics, University of Linz, Austria (unpubl. Ms.). 
Schwartz, H. (2000). Internattionalization and two liberal welfare states: Australia and New Zealand, In 
F. W. Scharpf & V. A. Schmidt (Eds.), Welfare and work in the open economy. Vol. II: diverse re-
sponses to common challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 69-130. 
Schwartz, H. (2001). Round up the usual suspects! Globalization, domestic politics, and welfare state 
change. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
17-44. 
Siegel, N. A. (2002). Baustelle Sozialpolitik. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Toninelli, P. A. (2000). The rise and fall of public enterprise. The framework. In P. A. Toninelli (Ed.), 3-
24. 
Toninelli, P. A. (Ed.) (2000a). The rise and fall of state-owned enterprise in the western world. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: how political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Vickers, J. & Wright, V. (Eds.), 1989: The Politics of Privatization in Western Europe. London. 
Wagschal, U., Ganser, D., Rentsch, H. (2002). Der Alleingang – Die Schweiz 10 Jahre nach dem EWR-
Nein. Zürich: Orell Füssli. 
Weaver, R. K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance, Journal of Public Policy, 6, 371-398. 
Wright, V. (Ed.). 1994: Privatization in Western Europe. Pressures, problems and paradoxes. London. 
Wright, V. (1994a). Industrial privatization in Western Europe. Pressures, problems and paradoxes. In V. 
Wright (Ed.), 1-43. 
Zohlnhöfer, R. (2001). Die Wirtschaftspolitik der Ära Kohl. Eine Analyse der Schlüsselentscheidungen in 
den Politikfeldern Finanzen, Arbeit und Entstaatlichung, 1982-1998. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
Zohlnhöfer, R. (2003). Der Einfluss von Parteien und Institutionen auf die Staatstätigkeit. In H. Obinger, 
U. Wagschal, & B. Kittel (Eds.), Politische Ökonomie. Demokratie und wirtschaftliche Leistungsfä-
higkeit. Opladen: UTB, 47-80. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 15) 
- 24 - 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
Herbert Obinger is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Bre-
men. Currently he is a visiting scholar at the Center for European Studies at Harvard 
University. Research interests include comparative welfare state research and compara-
tive political economy. His most recent publication is “Federalism and the Welfare Sta-
te. New World and European Experiences” (Cambridge University Press 2005, co-
edited with Stephan Leibfried and Francis G. Castles). 
Telephone:  +49 421-218-4369 
E-Mail: hobinger@zes.uni-bremen.de 
Address: Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Parkallee 39, 28209 Bremen, Germany 
 
Reimut Zohlnhöfer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Hei-
delberg. Currently he is John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Center for European 
Studies, Harvard University. His research interests include Comparative and Interna-
tional Political Economy as well as West European Politics. His most recent book is 
“Das rot-grüne Projekt. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder 1998-2002” (Westdeut-
scher Verlag 2003, co-edited with Christoph Egle and Tobias Ostheim)  
Telephone:  ++1-617-495-4303 x239 
E-Mail: rzohlnh@fas.harvard.edu 
Address: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland 
Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 
from July 1, 2005 
Telephone:  ++49-6221-543419 
E-Mail: rzh@uni-hd.de 
Address: Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, Universität Heidelberg, 
Marstallstr. 6, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany 
